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Closing the Book on Africa’s First Generation Coups 
JONATHAN POWELL and MWITA CHACHA 
Abstract: The Zimbabwe Defence Forces’ November 2017 removal of Robert Mugabe was 
the first successful military coup in Africa in over three years. Increasingly rare in 
contemporary politics, Mugabe’s removal at the barrel of the gun was a common fate for 
the original generation of political leadership in the region. We contextualize Mugabe’s 
removal by reviewing the fates of Sub-Saharan Africa’s original post-colonial leadership, 
of which a majority was directly removed in military coups. The fall of Mugabe can be seen 
as the final chapter on coups against the original generation of leadership, but is unique in 
regard to the fate of the ousted leader. Of all prior first generation leaders removed via a 
coup, each was imprisoned, exiled, or killed in association with the coup. 
Introduction 
Lumumba. Olympio. Nkrumah. Cabral. Mugabe. Following a week of attempting to coerce a 
resignation from their president, on 21 November 2017 the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) 
finally secured it, placing him as one of scores of heads of state who have been removed via 
coups in post-colonial Africa.1 Though Mugabe’s reign had been plagued by a variety of crises, 
he had previously managed to maintain the loyalty of the armed forces and the ruling ZANU-
PF. His efforts to purge high ranking ZANU-PF members, including notable veterans of the 
liberation war, eventually went too far with the dismissal of Vice President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa. In a highly organized maneuver, armed forces under the leadership of 
Constantino Chiwenga effectively removed Mugabe on 14 November. 
The coup was remarkable in a number of respects. Coups rarely unseat leaders as long-
tenured as Mugabe.  Further, though once described by Decalo as “the most visible and 
recurrent characteristic of the African political experience,” coups have become an increasing 
rarity.2 No African state had witnessed a leader removed via a coup in over three years at the 
time of Mugabe’s removal.3 No regime had even experienced a failed coup attempt since Gilbert 
Diendéré’s ill-fated effort to seize power in Burkina Faso in September 2014.4 Mugabe’s ouster 
at the hands of the soldiers who had previously supported him is perhaps less surprising, 
however, when viewed in a broader historical context. Though coups have been more of a rarity 
in the continent’s contemporary politics, such a fate was quite common for Africa’s original 
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generation of post-colonial leaders. Considering the fates of Africa’s initial independent 
leadership, or what we refer to here as the ‘old guard,’ illustrates the unfortunate frequency of 
military coups, including against some of the continent’s most prominent leaders. The ouster of 
Mugabe can then potentially be viewed as the final chapter of an earlier period of African 
political history, one that saw the original generation of leadership more likely to be removed 
via a coup than all other methods combined. 
In the following discussion, we explore the fate of the original leadership in Africa south of 
the Sahara, while focusing on countries which gained independence from a European colonizer 
after World War II. Given the desire to focus on the first generation of independent political 
leadership, the following assessment necessarily omits cases that were not formally colonized 
(Ethiopia, Liberia), cases which received independence from another African state (Eritrea, 
South Sudan, Cape Verde), or technically earned independence prior to this period (South 
Africa). This results in a sample of thirty-nine countries, of which twenty saw the old guard 
driven from power by a military coup.5  
However, the case also illustrates important differences. Of each of the twenty previous old 
guards who were removed from power via a military coup, all were either killed, imprisoned, 
or exiled in the coup’s aftermath. Mugabe’s post-tenure fate, as of this writing, is considerably 
better. While unique in this regard, Mugabe’s post-tenure fate is indicative of the contemporary 
era, one that has seen leaders fare considerably better following their ousters. We close the 
paper with a brief discussion of the reasons for these shifts in leader fates, focusing primarily on 
the desire of coup leaders and post-coup governments to attempt to legitimize the act. 
Conceptualizing Coups 
The ZDF’s removal of Mugabe included a number of notable characteristics, including efforts to 
convince both domestic and international audiences that the maneuver was not a coup. Beyond 
semantics, the distinction could have real world consequences by triggering a variety of 
bilateral or international frameworks that are designed to respond to coups. These efforts drew 
attention from many observers who suggested the event was not actually a coup, or perhaps a 
highly unusual one, citing both the desire to secure Mugabe’s resignation and the motives 
indicated in the original statement from the military. That statement, provided by Major 
General SB Moyo, claimed: “To both our people and the world beyond our borders, we wish to 
make it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover of government. What the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces is doing is to pacify a degenerating political, social and economic situation in 
our country which if not addressed may result in violent conflict.”6 
Such overtures, however, are far from unique. Even some of Africa’s more infamous coup 
leaders have offered similar statements. Joseph Mobutu, for example, noted his “neutralization” 
of Patrice Lumumba was “not a military coup d’état, but merely a peaceful revolution…No 
soldier will be in power.”7 Even five years later, after removing Joseph Kasavubu, the 
international press did not take alarm over Mobutu’s actions. Reuters, for example, noted that 
“The thin, bespectacled young man does not look the role of the strong man.”8 Mobutu did, of 
course, hold on to power for over three decades. Idi Amin, meanwhile, noted he was “not a 
politician, but a professional soldier…mine will be purely a caretaker administration, pending 
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an early return to civilian rule.”9 Within a week Amin backtracked on his promise, establishing 
himself as president and overseeing a calamitous eight-year reign.  
Post-coup statements on the lack of political objectives are also frequently accompanied by 
concerted efforts to legitimize actions. This can involve a variety of efforts, including securing a 
resignation, having the parliament endorse the effort after the fact, or—much more common 
recently—holding an election. Mugabe’s resignation would be but the most recent example of 
such efforts. Farcau specifically notes that putschists often go to great lengths to legitimize 
coups through securing resignations.10 Burkina Faso’s Maurice Yaméogo took such signaling a 
step further, having been quoted as saying he was “rejoiced” at his removal, going on to claim 
“I am happy that the Chief of Staff of the army, surrounded by this officers, has been able in 
perfect harmony with me, to act in such a way that the country can go forward.”11 
Nor does popularity among the masses disqualify the event as a coup. Though thousands 
may have celebrated Mugabe’s ouster in the streets of Harare, popular support does not change 
the manner in which the incumbent was removed. Calls by protesters for military intervention 
are quite common, as are post-coup celebrations. For example, Christophe Soglo seized power 
from Hubert Maga following a general strike in Benin during which participants overtly waived 
signs calling for his removal.12 Just two years later, protesters again called for the military to 
remove Justin Ahomadegbe.13 Kenneth Kaunda, meanwhile, was put in the awkward situation 
where civilians celebrated while thinking the long-time ruler had been toppled. Kaunda, of 
course, survived Mwamba Luchembe’s move against him. These were all, of course, coups. 
Scholars, pundits, and even soldiers can debate over the precise definition of a coup, and 
squabble over whether specific cases fit the definition. Many cases are quite ambiguous and are 
often coded in different ways by different data projects. There are, however, commonalities. 
Coups are generally thought of as efforts to unseat the current chief executive, waged via illegal 
(though not necessarily violent) means, by conspirators who are some part of the formal state 
apparatus. Unsurprisingly, this is primarily seen with actions from the armed forces. For the 
purposes of this discussion, we reviewed multiple commonly used data projects and directly 
evaluated the political fate of each leader. For consistency with prior research, our discussion 
below—unless noted otherwise—relies on the classification offered in the Archigos Dataset of 
Political Leaders.14 This project codes the manner of entering and exiting office, including 
considering whether the executive was specifically removed by the military. We do, however, 
describe a number of instances of disagreement with the data where necessary. 
We present the mode of exit for each leader covered in this discussion in Table 1. The data 
indicate that nineteen of the thirty-eight “old guards” who had left office prior to Mugabe were 
removed by their militaries. The next most common manner of exit, natural death, only resulted 
in eight cases. Also revealing is that these nineteen military coups exclude other cases that 
narrowly miss the formal definition of a coup, but in which the military played a deciding role. 
For example, the Republic of the Congo’s Fulbert Youlou faced a crisis when confronted by a 
wide coalition of protesters during the Trois Glorieuses in 1963. His requests for support from 
both his own soldiers and a French garrison went unanswered, and he was instead requested 
by his army to resign.15 The military took an active role in the transition, which saw the 
constitution suspended, the national assembly dissolved, and the army’s selection of Alphonse 
Massamba-Débat as Prime Minister. Similarly, the “Malagasy May” saw Philibert Tsiranana 
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ousted under similar pressure from protesters in 1972. Though the armed forces were not 
directly responsible for Tsiranana’s removal, executive power transferred directly to 
Madagascar’s Defense Chief, Major General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. 
 
Even leaders who managed to avoid being ousted by their militaries often survived 
substantial threats. Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, for example, infamously faced large scale 
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army mutinies in Kenya and Tanzania, respectively, in January 1964.16 Other leaders survived 
coup attempts, including Mozambique’s Samora Machel (1975), Somalia’s Aden Abdullah 
Osman Daar (1961), Angola’s Agostinho Neto (1977), Senegal’s Léopold Senghor (1962), and 
Zambia’s Kaunda (1991).17 Of the leaders considered in this study, only Botswana’s Seretse 
Khama, Cameroon’s Ahmadou Ahidjo, and Guinea’s Sékou Touré avoided these events. 
The Fates of Leaders 
African old guards also saw a much more direct and sinister side of their armed forces.  Often 
“done with the connivance – where not the collaboration – of the west,” many leaders did not 
survive these threats, either in the political or biological sense.18 The post-tenure fates of leaders 
is summarized in Table 2. Specifically, the table reports the leader’s fate in the immediate 
aftermath of the coup. Notably, Patrice Lumumba was murdered months after his 1960 
“neutralization” by Joseph Mobutu. Sylvanus Olympio was gunned down just a stone’s throw 
from the American embassy during Togo’s 1963 putsch. Soon after Nigeria’s 1966 coup, Prime 
Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewaz’s body was found unceremoniously dumped on the 
roadside. Chad’s N’Garta Tombalbayev was later executed by his military during the 1975 coup 
against him. Equatorial Guinea’s Francisco Macías Nguema, meanwhile, was quickly tried and 
executed following his 1979 ouster.  
 
Primarily benefiting from being abroad when the coup was undertaken, five of those 
ousted managed to immediately transition to life in exile, such as Gambia’s Dawda Jawara, 
Burundi’s Mwambutsa IV, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Lesotho’s Leabua Jonathan, and Guinea-
Bissau’s Luís Cabral. Beyond these, Uganda’s Milton Obote managed to return to power almost 
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a decade after being exiled by Idi Amin, though he would be permanently exiled after another 
coup against him in 1985. Most, leaders, however, were at least initially jailed. Mauritania’s 
Moktar Ould Daddah was jailed for a year before being exiled to France. David Dacko was 
imprisoned for over three years following Jean Bedel Bokassa’s New Years 1966 coup in the 
Central African Republic. Dacko managed to return to the presidency following the demise of 
the Bokassa regime, but was again ousted in another coup in 1981. Leon Mba’s detention was at 
least short lived, thanks to a swift French intervention that restored him to the Gabonese 
presidency. 
Other old guards, however, were less fortunate. Despite initially being involved in the post-
coup regime, Benin’s Hubert Maga was quickly accused of plotting against new president 
Christophe Soglo and promptly jailed. Maga’s supporters took action to secure his release, 
engaging in high profile attacks that required a military campaign against them. Maga was 
subsequently allowed to go into exile. Niger’s Hamani Diori, whose wife was killed during the 
coup against him, was imprisoned for six years, and held under house arrest for another seven 
before living out his final years in Morocco. Maurice Yaméogo’s public displays of support for 
the coup against him did little good, as he was quickly jailed and sentenced to hard labor. His 
four years of imprisonment included multiple suicide attempts. Mali’s Modibo Keita passed 
away while still a prisoner, nine years following his removal. Rwanda’s Grégoire Kayibanda 
and his wife disappeared following the coup against him. It is believed they were held prisoner 
in a secret location and intentionally starved to death. 
That Mugabe’s fate would be sealed by his military is not unusual when compared 
alongside other old guards. He joins a pantheon of post-colonial and pan-Africanist leaders who 
were removed at the barrel of a gun, particularly when we consider Mugabe’s role as a 
founding leader. As the military continued the time-honored tradition of legitimization through 
ex post resignation and other forms of legal window dressing, the comparative safety of the 
ousted leader represents an important departure from this earlier era. Mugabe’s improved post-
coup fate is itself likely a product of efforts to seek external legitimacy for both the coup plotters 
and subsequent government, a dynamic that appears to be especially strong in the 
contemporary era, and something that the Zimbabwe case saw the plotters do quite well. 
Whereas other “more obvious” military coups, such as the 2009 ouster of Marc 
Ravalomanana in Madagascar that was followed by external condemnation, sanctions, and 
mediation attempts from relevant regional organizations including the Southern African 
Development Community, such international sanctioning did not follow the removal of 
Mugabe. Indeed, regional power South Africa, along with other key members of the SADC, did 
not voice any reservations regarding the military’s seizure of power and at one point appeared 
to be negotiating Mugabe’s resignation following his house arrest. The presence of some of the 
leaders of these SADC member-states at the inauguration of Mnangagwa seemed to indicate 
Mugabe’s prior loss of external legitimacy, accompanied by the calculated efforts of the military 
to legitimize the coup, led to the tacit endorsement of the action. Further, though numerous 
actors pointed to various flaws in the electoral process, the AU, SADC, and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa all refrained from criticizing the election.19 
Aside from Mugabe’s prior loss of legitimacy, actions taken by the coup plotters and 
Mnangagwa likely played a role in tempering international responses. This is true for both 
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initial attempts to pitch Mugabe’s resignation as willing, as well as later efforts to improve the 
(though still flawed) electoral process. Mugabe’s status after the coup is also a likely product of 
this process. Our review of both the Archigos dataset and an original assessment of post-coup 
leader fates indicates that important temporal dynamics are at play. Of Africa’s old guards, 25 
percent of those removed via a coup were killed during or immediately after the event. Looking 
more broadly at all African leaders ousted during the Cold War reveals that almost 20 percent 
of those removed via coups were killed. This is in stark contrast to the region’s contemporary 
politics, which has seen no leaders killed during or after the fifteen successful coups that have 
occurred under the AU.20 
This shift in fates is not coincidental. Though coups do obviously still occur, a growing 
anti-coup norm has encouraged coup plotters to take various actions to gain legitimacy. While 
most obvious with the now almost ubiquitous calling of post-coup elections, contemporary 
international norms have likely served ousted leaders in one important—yet 
underappreciated—manner: selling legitimacy is better served when the deposed are treated 
well. 
Notes 
1 We ultimately use multiple efforts to define and classify coup events. As a default, we define 
coups as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus 
to unseat the sitting executive.” Unless noted otherwise, we are referring to successful coups. 
See Powell and Thyne 2011. 
2 Decalo1 1990, p. 148. On the decline of coups, see Powell, J. et al. 2016.  
3 Goemans, H. et al. 2009. 
4 References to failed coup attempts are taken from Powell and Thyne 2011. 
5 This includes considering the removal of Mwambutsa IV of Burundi a military coup. The 
monarch fled during a 1965 coup effort from Hutu army officers, never to return. Crown 
Prince Ntare V acted as ruler in his absence prior to formally deposing his father in July 1966. 
He was himself ousted in a military coup just months later.  The Archigos dataset considers 
the event to be a “removal by other government actors,” which would still qualify as a coup 
by most standards, though not of the military variety. 
6 The Guardian 2017. 
7 Frindethie 2016, p. 230. 
8 Reuters 1965. 
9 Otunnu 2016.  
10 Farcau 1994.  
11 New York Times 1966. 
12  New York Times 1963. 
13  New York Times 1965. 
14 Goemans et al. 2009. 
15 Onwumechili 1998, p. 45; Decalo 1990. 
16 Mazrui and Rothchild 1967.  
17 Powell and Thyne 2011. 
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18 First 1971, p. 21. 
19 The East African 2018. 
20 Guinea-Bissau’s Joao Vieira was killed by members of the armed forces in March 2009. Due 
to the military’s disinterest in seizing power, and the constitutional manner of Vieira’s 
succession, the event is considered an assassination rather than a military coup. 
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